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In this book, I set out to provide a comprehensive account of Nietzsche’s material object 
metaphysics, and I argue that he is a constructivist. Constructivism is the heterodox view that 
our practices bring all objects into existence. The reading of Nietzsche is not brand-new in the 
literature, but Nietzsche’s constructivism has never been systematically explained or defended. 
This is strange given that constructivism strikes most readers as either flat-out false, and so not 
worth taking seriously, or extremely controversial, and so not worth embracing. I think that 
once Nietzsche’s view is properly spelled out, however, his position is much stronger than it 
might initially seem to be. And I claim that reading Nietzsche as a constructivist can help 
illuminate key areas of his philosophical program as a whole. For this to become clear, though, 
it first needs to be argued that constructivism is indeed Nietzsche’s preferred view of material 
objects. And so that is where I begin. 
The book starts by challenging alternative readings of Nietzsche’s view of objects. Some 
believe that he is a commonsense realist (Clark 1990; Leiter 1994, 2002). Some hold that he is 
an eliminativist (Nola 1999; Meyer 2011). And some argue that he reconceives objects as 
bundles of forces, or more simply, bundles of empirical properties. One version of this view, 
unificationism, holds that bundles are unified intrinsically (Hales and Welshon 1999; Doyle 
2009), whereas another version holds that bundles are unified extrinsically, though human 
practices. I defend this last reading.  
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As I see things, Nietzsche holds that objects are conceptually unified bundles of 
empirical properties. Planets, for instance, are bundles of properties the concept <planet> 
refers to, namely, objects that orbit the sun, remain round, and are gravitationally dominant. 
The world is filled with various clusters of properties, Nietzsche thinks, but no cluster is a formal 
unity—and thus a bona fide object—apart from our representational practices. This view of 
objects, I argue, best fits Nietzsche’s texts. From early to late, Nietzsche repeatedly claims that 
objects are ontologically dependent on human practices. Commonsense realism, eliminativism, 
and unificationism all deny such dependence, and thus none get Nietzsche right.    
 Constructivism does not imply that we can simply create objects at will, or that the 
existence of objects depends merely on subjective preferences, or that, with respect to what 
objects exist, anything goes. Nietzsche places significant constraints on construction, though no 
constraint uniquely determines what is or can be constructed. Most importantly, object 
construction depends on empirical properties encountered in experience. Objects are bundles 
of properties that we have sensible access to. Other constraints on constructing objects include 
the experience of resistance, the current body of accepted beliefs, the fact that construction is 
a social phenomenon, and epistemic values like consistency, utility, and scope. These 
constraints rein in subjectivism and facile forms of relativism. 
 The fact that Nietzsche’s constructivism is heavily constrained does not mean that the 
position comes without serious objections. Perhaps the most pressing objection is that 
constructivism, Nietzsche’s or otherwise, is bankrupt because it cannot account for unperceived 
objects, most importantly objects in the past. It is obvious that dinosaurs roamed the earth 
prior to the existence of human representational practices, for instance, and hence it appears 
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false that our representational practices bring dinosaurs into existence. I suggest that Nietzsche 
can respond to this worry by drawing on Kant’s view that reality is that which we can in 
principle encounter in experience. To say that velociraptors existed, for example, is to say that 
we can track a causal chain from something we perceive in the present—perhaps the 
perception of some recently uncovered fossils—back to when the application conditions for the 
concept <velociraptor> are met. And, crucially, we play a constitutive role in determining these 
conditions, that is, which group of identifying properties <velociraptor> bundles. These 
properties include being a bipedal, feathered carnivore in the Cretaceous period. The specific 
group of properties that constitute objects like velociraptors are brought together through our 
conceptual organization of the world, past or present. This allows Nietzsche to say that objects 
in the past are constructed. 
 Another objection concerns bootstrapping. Nietzsche holds that we bring objects into 
existence. One might argue, however, that we are also objects. So, it seems that objects bring 
objects into existence, which appears absurd. I think Nietzsche’s response is to explain away 
the problem. For Nietzsche, we gain determinate conditions of identity as we attempt to 
understand who we are in experience, from evolved organisms, to moral persons, to mothers 
and fathers. If this is accurate, then there seems to be no problem in claiming that we construct 
objects and we are constructed in turn.  
 Understanding that Nietzsche is a constructivist enables us to gain a better 
understanding of other important aspects of his philosophical project. Consider his views of 
truth and science, for instance. It is more or less standard to believe that Nietzsche rejects the 
pragmatist view that truth is that which, in the way of belief, works, given our interests. But I 
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suggest that Nietzsche endorses what William James and F. C. S. Schiller call a “humanist” view 
of truth. On this view, truths concerning concrete objects are constructed because the objects 
of reference of our true and false propositions that populate the empirical world are 
constructed. Nietzsche embraces a pragmatist understanding of truth, then, in the sense that 
propositions pertaining to the empirical world gain a truth-evaluable status only in relation to 
our interests.  
 Nietzsche’s view of science is even more controversial. Commentators disagree over 
whether Nietzsche thinks science can represent the facts about the world. Some believe that 
Nietzsche takes science to be successful because it represents the mind-independent world, 
and others believe that he rejects the possibility of successful science altogether. I argue that 
Nietzsche’s praise of science rests on accepting constructivism. It is a short path from 
constructivism about objects to constructivism about facts. Nietzsche seems to think that a fact 
is just an object instantiating a property, and if so, then determining which properties 
constitute objects implies determining the facts about the world. Science can successfully 
represent the world, then, and this success turns on facts being mind-dependent.  
 As I see things, Nietzsche’s motivation for developing this controversial view of facts and 
objects lies in overcoming what worries him most: the advent of nihilism. For Nietzsche, 
nihilism is the position that life is meaningless because our highest values cannot be realized in 
this world. One such value is what Nietzsche calls the “true world,” that is, some world 
ontologically independent of the empirical world which typically illuminates the true nature of 
the empirical world. From Plato and the Forms to Christianity and the Kingdom of Heaven, 
Nietzsche thinks humans have most often turned to the true world to find life meaningful. Even 
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those who dedicate their lives to science and philosophy, Nietzsche argues, have fallen into the 
trap of valuing the true world. Scientists and philosophers commonly believe that our best 
theories should be those that, at least in part, represent constitutively mind-independent 
objects. But constructivism renders this goal unattainable. Coming to recognize the truth of 
constructivism therefore enables us to see that a longstanding goal of scientific and 
philosophical inquiry cannot be realized. Constructivism even rejuvenates our cognitive aims 
with new purpose, which helps us overcome nihilism concerning our theoretical projects. 
Constructivism is not merely a metaphysical position, then, but a metaphysical position with 
vital ethical consequences. Nietzsche’s commitment to constructivism helps him combat his 
greatest philosophical concern. 
The book’s penultimate chapter compares and contrasts Nietzsche’s constructivism with 
seemingly similar versions offered by those in the American pragmatist tradition, namely, 
William James, Nelson Goodman, and Richard Rorty. I argue that Nietzsche is closest to James 
and furthest from Rorty. The book finishes with an examination of how Nietzsche’s 
constructivism might resolve difficult problems in analytic material object metaphysics, 
specifically the argument from vagueness, arbitrariness arguments, debunking arguments, and 
arguments concerning indeterminate identity. Most metaphysicians today reject the 
commonsense idea that what objects exist are those we typically take to exist—dogs and cats, 
tables and chairs, planets and moons. They instead believe that there are either indefinitely 
many objects right before our eyes (permissivism) or no objects (eliminativism). Both of these 
options, of course, deeply violate our everyday intuitions. I argue that Nietzsche’s 
constructivism provides a unique way to defend these intuitions. 
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For example, consider how a constructivist might respond to a common argument from 
arbitrariness. Permissivists might claim that incars exist because islands exist. Incars are cars 
that only exist in garages—they go out of existence when leaving a garage, similar to the way in 
which we might say that islands go out of existence when completely submerged in water. This 
similarity leads permissivists to claim that there is no ontologically significant difference 
between islands and incars, and so it would be objectionably arbitrary to accept the existence 
of islands, but not incars. The constructivist, however, can say that there is indeed an 
ontologically significant difference: we take islands to exist, but not incars. And the reason for 
this difference is not obvious, or philosophically shallow. The constructivist argues that there 
are no unique bundles of properties in the world that require reference by way of extraordinary 
concepts like <incar>, whereas there are for <island>. The identity conditions of incars can be 
sufficiently picked out using familiar concepts like <car>, <garage>, and so on. This is just one 
way constructivism offers a principled way to defend common sense and take back a world that 
has slipped through the fingers of analytic metaphysicians. I think this should render 
constructivism much more attractive than it has traditionally been taken to be. 
But—and I will finish with this—Nietzsche’s constructivism is flexible, and for the better. 
Nietzsche is certainly not trapped into defending common sense ontologies. Constructivism can 
adapt with the times. Nietzsche simply denies that any particular conceptual scheme has the 
ability to represent the way objects are tenselessly and timelessly. Our concepts, which fix the 
conditions of identity of objects, develop and change in relation to our needs, interests, and 
purposes. Given our perennial interest in understanding the existence and nature of objects 
that shape our perception of the world and ourselves—from gendered bodies, to invasive 
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species, to artificially intelligent entities—the ability to permit significant change, and 
sometimes even radical change, might be the most valuable quality of Nietzsche’s 
constructivism.  
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